Managers use internal competition to motivate worker e¤ort, yet economic theory suggests that the bene…ts of competition may depend critically on workers' relative abilities-large di¤erences in skill may reduce competitors' e¤orts. This paper uses panel data from professional golfers and …nds that the presence of a superstar in a rankorder tournament is associated with lower competitor performance. On average, higherskill PGA golfers'…rst-round scores are approximately 0.2 strokes higher when Tiger Woods participates, relative to when Woods is absent. The overall superstar e¤ect for tournaments is approximately 0.8 strokes. The adverse superstar e¤ect increases when Woods is playing well and disappears during Woods's weaker periods. There is no evidence that reduced performance is due to "riskier" play.
Introduction
Proponents of internal competition systems contend that within-…rm contests fuel employee e¤orts. They claim that, spurred by the performance of other team members and the possibility of rewards based on their relative success, workers are motivated to exert high e¤ort. Tournament-style competition pits workers against each other for tenure, promotion and rewards, and winners and losers emerge. GE's former CEO Jack Welch instituted a "20-70-10" system for workers, generously rewarding the top 20% of employees and "managing out"the bottom 10% each year. Indeed, it seems that Welch is not alone in his belief that e¤ective management strategies rely on meaningful di¤erentiation between employees; 3M, Bloomingdale's, Procter & Gamble, IBM, Digital, Johnson & Johnson, GM and Hewlett-Packard all use between-and within-team competition to provide incentives for quality and innovation (Marino and Zábojník, 2003; Eisenhardt and Gahmic, 2000) .
Tournaments are important compensation structures found in many contexts: …rms reward the top salesperson; contracts are awarded to …rms with the best technological innovation; assistant professors compete for a limited number of tenure positions; corporate vice-presidents compete to become company president; and, professional athletes compete to clinch national titles and awards. In these situations, rewards are based only on the relative performance or rank of those vying for the prize.
Common intuition suggests that rivalries may encourage a player to exert more e¤ort. In a high-school gymnasium, community pool or college track, one might hear a coach encouraging athletes to "step up their game"against the opposition. But, is it the case that harnessing the power of competition always bolsters e¤ort? I present an economic model, consistent with the extant literature on contests and tournaments, that suggests not. 1 In particular, these models suggest that the presence of a "superstar"in a competition can lead to reduced e¤orts from tournament participants. 2 Consider two sports-inspired scenarios. In the …rst, you face a rival of similar skill and are motivated to work harder, relative to your normal e¤ort, in a very "winnable" race. In the second scenario, you are matched against a highly-trained athlete and your probability of winning is very low. Competing is costly and there is always the risk of pulled muscles. In this case, you may actually reduce your e¤ort in the contest. That is, the presence of a 1 Some managers have noted other potential downsides to internal competition, including perceptions of …rm weakness and the duplication of e¤ort, and employee distraction (Birkinshaw, 2001 ; Davenport and Beck, 2000) . 2 I use the term "superstar" in the same spirit as Sherwin Rosen in his 1981 paper, "The Economics of Superstars". He describes the Superstar phenomenon as a concentration of output among a few individuals; I use the term to describe a dominant player. That is, a superstar provides consistently superior performance relative to the …eld of competitors. superstar discourages you from expending your full e¤ort in the competition.
The "20-70-10" system and similar compensation devices are based on the notion that competition leads to greater e¤ort, yet economic theory suggests that the opposite can occur under some circumstances-the bene…ts of competition depend crucially on the degree to which competitors are relatively equal in underlying ability. An adverse "superstar e¤ect" is an intriguing theoretical possibility, but should managers worry in practice? Is there empirical validity to the theoretical claim that superstars adversely a¤ect incentives in rankorder tournaments?
Measuring the performance and rewards of corporate executives, new lawyers, and fashion trend-setters is challenging, and rich data on sales performance in …rms are largely unavailable. Moreover, the relationship between e¤ort and observable performance is quite noisy in these contexts. Professional golf o¤ers an excellent setting in which to examine tournament theory and superstars in rank-order events, since e¤ort relates relatively directly to scores and performance measures are not confounded by team dynamics.
This paper uses data from Tiger Woods and the PGA Tour to examine the adverse incentive e¤ect of a superstar in tournaments. The dataset includes round-by-round scores for all players in every PGA tournament from 1999 to 2006 and hole-by-hole data for all tournaments from 2002 to 2006. I estimate the impact of the superstar's presence on the scores of other golfers, examining …rst all regular and major tournaments and then the subset of courses that Woods had elected to play over his professional career. Results are robust to several speci…cations and are consistent with my prediction that the presence of a superstar leads other players to reduce their e¤orts.
The main results of the papers are:
1. The presence of a superstar in a tournament is associated with reduced performance from other competitors: Players'scores are nearly 0.2 strokes higher in the …rst round of a tournament when Woods participates, relative to their scores when Woods is not in the …eld. Across all rounds of a tournament, the adverse superstar e¤ect for highly-skilled (exempt) PGA golfers'scores is, on average, almost one stroke.
In summary, there is both theory and empirical evidence that the presence of a superstar in tournament reduces the e¤orts of other participants. Tournaments are important compensation systems found in many business contexts. Yet, to my knowledge, this is the …rst paper to investigate the impact of superstars in rank-order tournaments.
Consider the implications of my results for several speci…c questions: When sales bonuses are based on relative performance, does introducing a superstar salesperson motivate or discourage others in the team? Does hiring a "hot-shot" vice-president lead to a reduction of e¤ort from other executives also vying for the top corporate position? Should the law …rm hire a cohort of associates with similar skill levels and avoid the superstar entirely? These questions have practical importance-they may guide …rms'hiring, compensation, and management strategies. Estimating the impact of superstars on incentives is an important …rst step toward clear answers.
Theory predicts that a reduction in e¤ort can be an equilibrium response when a player faces a superstar challenger. Therefore, depending on the relative outputs of the players, the presence of a superstar in a tournament may actually reduce overall team performance. For example, associates in law and medical …rms compete to become partners. Their competition is e¤ectively a tournament, since …rms take on more associates than there are available partner positions. If the presence of a superstar undermines the e¤orts of other associates, and the additional gains from the star do not o¤set the losses from the others, then a …rm might be better o¤ hiring a cohort of similarly talented associates. That is, the overall performance of a group of non-superstar employees might be superior to the overall performance of a group with a single star.
Other features of tournaments and performance incentives have been explored empirically in several settings. Knoeber and Thurman (1994) compare tournament and linear payment schemes using data from a sample of US broiler producers. They examine the impact of prizes on performance level and variability and, in contrast with my …ndings, conclude that less-able producers adopt riskier strategies. Eriksson (1999) uses industry data from Denmark and suggests that wider pay dispersion leads to greater employee e¤ort. Sunde (2003) and Lallemand, Plasman, and Rycx (2009) examine professional tennis data to study heterogeneity in elimination tournaments. They …nd that the lower-ranked players tend to underperform in uneven matches.
Tournament theory also has been examined in a laboratory setting: Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987) …nd that disadvantaged contestants provide more e¤ort than predicted by tournament theory. While that study touches on the e¤ect of heterogeneous contestants on tournament e¤ort in the laboratory, my work identi…es a superstar and uses data generated in a real-world context. Some aspects of political races can be framed as tournaments; Levitt (1994) uses …eld data in his analysis of campaign expenditure in US House elections and contends that political spending is highest in close races.
Several researchers have focused on tournaments in the world of professional golf; however, few have used a panel dataset like the one employed here, and none has examined the presence of a superstar. Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a) use data from a subsample of PGA tournaments in 1984 to show that larger prizes lead to lower scores, a result I do not observe in my analysis. While some of their speci…cations control for the ability of players surrounding a competitor on the …nal day of play, they do not discuss how competitors' skill heterogeneity a¤ects performance. In another paper, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990b) use data from the 1987 European PGA Tour and …nd again that higher prize levels result in lower scores. However, Orszag (1994) Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) , Dixit (1987) , and Moldovanu and Sela (2001) , have extended the theoretical literature on tournaments, yet none has focused on the impact of a superstar on tournament incentives.
The paper is organized as follows: First, to motivate my empirical study, I present a two-player contest model in section 2. In section 3, I outline some important features of professional golf and describe the PGA Tour data used in my analysis. Section 4 presents the econometric analysis and considers several alternative explanations for the observed adverse superstar e¤ect. Section 5 reframes the results and concludes. contest modelling. The probabilities that players 1 and 2 win the contest are which yields the …rst-order condition
Similarly, the …rst-order condition for player 2 is
It is follows that e 1 = e 2 in any equilibrium and the common equilibrium e¤ort is
From (1) ; I derive my main testable hypothesis:
The result in (2) indicates that larger di¤erences in players'abilities will lead to lower equilibrium e¤ort from both players and is consistent with the more general two-player results in Leininger (1993) and Baik (1994) . Stein (2002) studies an n-player asymmetric rent-seeking contest. He …nds that an increase in a player's ability leads to a decrease in the e¤ort of all other players; in his model, expenditures decrease with increased relative lobbying e¤ectiveness. In this paper, I hypothesize that the presence of a player with superstar abilities will lead players to reduce their e¤ort in the contest.
These two-and n-player models represent contests with a single prize; however, the results are suggestive for other contexts. In particular, tournaments with very non-linear prize schedules may be considered approximately "winner-take-all."
Data
While this paper has implications beyond golf, the following section explains some important features of professional golf and describes the PGA Tour dataset used in the analysis.
The Game
The objective of golf is to complete each hole with the fewest strikes of the ball. That is, low scores are better than high scores. Each hole's par value describes how the course is designed to be played by an experienced golfer. Players are "under" and "over" par if they complete a hole in fewer or more strokes than par, respectively.
Professional golf tournaments typically consist of four rounds (Thursday through Sunday). Final positions are assigned according to players'total scores for the event. A "cut" is made after the second round. In most tournaments, only the top 70 golfers and those tied for 70 th position play the third and fourth rounds. 5 All players who make the cut earn prize money; players who miss the cut receive no prize. In the case of a tie for …rst place, additional playo¤ holes determine the tournament winner. While purse size di¤ers by tournament, the prize distribution is …xed and non-linear on the PGA Tour. The top 15 golfers earn approximately 70% of the total purse: tournament winners receive 18% of the purse, while second through …fth positions earn 10.8, 6.8 and 4.8%, respectively. The golfer in 70 th position receives 0.2% of the purse.
Not all PGA Tour golfers can participate in all events. "Exempt"players automatically qualify, while "non-exempt" golfers must qualify for individual tournaments. Exemptions are distributed according to a detailed list of priorities. In general, recent tour winners and golfers who …nished in the top 125 positions on the money list in the previous year earn exempt status. On average, exempt players are higher skilled than non-exempt golfers.
Professional golfers are highly-trained athletes who exert e¤ort to excel at the game. A golfer may choose to hit balls on the driving range, play practice rounds, and study the course before the tournament. During competition, he may take extra care to consider his lie, the target, the weather conditions and his club selection-activities that require considerable e¤ort and result in improved performance. In fact, it is the close relationship between e¤ort and performance that make golf data particularly suitable for this study.
The presence of a superstar, Tiger Woods, is a key feature of professional golf and critical for identi…cation in my paper. Woods won his …rst PGA tournament within weeks of turning attention and future career opportunities; the payo¤ to second position may be simply the (smaller) cash prize. 5 Some events use a 10-stroke rule to determine the cut-for example, in the US Open, the cut includes the low 60 scorers (and ties), and any player within 10 strokes of the leader. 6 From the data, I can identify players who made the cut, did not make the cut, withdrew or were disquali…ed. Course information, including location, par, and yardage, was matched with players' scores. In addition, data on course conditions and weather during play were obtained from the National Climatic Data Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrations. 7 I also matched players'tournament scores to monthly average O¢ cial World Golf Ranking (OWGR) statistics, which measure golfers' relative quality. 8 Players earn OWGR points based on …nishing positions and …eld strength in PGA events in the previous two years, and the points are time-weighted. Data for the top 200 golfers are available, and unranked players were assigned a point value of zero. 6 Tournament score data were gathered from GolfWeek magazine's website (www.golfweek.com) and The Golf Channel (www.thegolfchannel.com). Additional golf course information was collected from the Golf Course Superintendents Association of America website (www.gcsaa.org). Player data were gathered from the PGA TOUR website (www.pgatour.com). 7 Because not all event locations are NOAA weather station sites, tournaments are matched with the closest NOAA site. The "closest" site was selected by hand to ensure geographic similarities. For example, a coastal golf course was matched with the closest coastal weather station. 8 OWGR data were gathered from www.o¢ cialworldgolfranking.com. Scores exhibit a consistent and expected pattern-exempt players post lower (better) scores than non-exempt players in regular and major tournaments in every year. T-tests reject the hypotheses that exempt and non-exempt players scores are equal each year at p-values < 0:01. Scores in major events are also statistically-signi…cantly higher than scores for regular events for both types of players (p-values < 0:01).
Descriptive Statistics
The superstar play of Tiger Woods is evident in Table 1 ; his scores in regular and major events are signi…cantly lower than the mean scores of other exempt golfers in all years except 2004. 9 In his outstanding 2001 season, Woods averaged nearly 5 strokes better than the average exempt player. In major tournaments, Woods played more than 7 strokes better than his exempt competitors. Players'skill measure, OWGR points, are reported at the bottom of Table 1 . On average, exempt players earned approximately 2 points; Woods often earned 10 times more points than other exempt golfers. Figure 1 presents the distribution of OWGR points for exempt players in 2000 and shows Woods's position as the top-ranked player-other exempt players averaged 2.46 points, excellent players such as Mickelson, Els and Duval earned approximately 11 points, and Woods accumulated more than 29 points. 10 According to Table 1 , even in his "slump" 2004 season, Woods accumulated six times more points than an average exempt golfer. While the values in Table 1 do not address Woods's e¤ect on other golfers, the descriptive statistics provide further evidence of his "superstardom." 
Results: The Presence of a Superstar
My empirical analysis examines Woods's impact on the performance of other golfers on the PGA tour. The dataset, described in section 3, consists of players'identities, hole-by-hole and …nal scores, prize money, and other individual and tournament attributes from 363 tournaments on the PGA Tour between 1999 and 2006.
Simple comparisons of mean scores of other golfers in the presence and absence of a superstar provide a suggestive start and motivate the analysis. Table 2 provides a summary of average scores relative to par for exempt and non-exempt players by year, separating tournaments in which Woods did and did not participate. T-tests reject the equality of means for exempt players overall and for all eight years individually (p-values < 0:01).
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Similar tests reject the equality of means for non-exempt players in all years except 2005, where I cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal means at conventional signi…cance levels. Table 3 presents summary statistics for di¤erent hole-level scores in rounds from 2002 to 2006. On average, golfers have slightly fewer eagles (2 strokes under par) per round in tournaments with Woods, relative to when they are not competing with the superstar; a t-test rejects the equality of means at a p-value of 0:06. However, players post more bogeys (1 stroke over par) and double-bogeys (2 strokes over par) when the superstar is presentthe di¤erences are small, but statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at p-values of 0.07 and 0.04, respectively. These …gures suggest that more high scores and fewer low scores are posted in tournaments with Woods, relative to when he does not compete.
The summary statistics in Tables 2 and 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that players reduce their e¤ort when they face the superstar. The regression analysis reported in the following sections parse the "superstar e¤ect"from other tournament-, course-and conditionspeci…c e¤ects.
Econometric Speci…cation
The hypothesis outlined in section 2 suggests the following initial econometric speci…cation:
where strokes ij is the score, in terms of strokes above or below par, for player i in tournament j, star j is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the superstar is present in the tournament, and exempt i is a dummy variable indicating the exempt or non-exempt status of a player in a given year. In addition, I include X j , a matrix of tournament-and course-speci…c controls, and Y i , a matrix of variables representing player attributes. Finally, " ij is the error term. I estimate the equation using OLS with a robust variance estimator that is clustered by player-year to allow for correlation across an individual golfer's tournaments in a given year. 12 Because the variable of particular interest is the presence of the superstar, Woods's scores are omitted from the regressions. The coe¢ cient on the superstar dummy ( 1 ) captures the e¤ect of Woods's presence on the scores of non-exempt (lower-skill) players. The sum of the superstar and superstarexempt interaction ( 1 + 3 ) captures Woods's impact on exempt (higher-skill) players. In some tables, I also report the total superstar e¤ect for exempt and non-exempt players, respectively.
The matrix of tournament controls, X j , may include the following variables:
Year Dummies -Fixed e¤ects for 1999 to 2006 are included to control for annual di¤erences in scores.
Major Dummy -I use an indicator for the four major tournaments (US Open, British Open, PGA Championship and the Masters) which are prestigious, attract a strong …eld of players and are notoriously challenging.
World Golf Championship (WGC) Dummy -I use an indicator to identify World Golf Championship events, part of a series of tournaments that attract players from the PGA, European and Japan Golf Tours.
Yardage -The total length of the course in yards may impact the di¢ culty of play. Average yardage is included when the tournament was played on several courses.
Number of Rounds -More rounds give players more opportunities to accumulate strokes over and under par (e.g. while a golfer may be 12 under for four rounds, he is unlikely to be 12 under for a single round). Nearly 95% of PGA tournaments consist of four rounds.
Temperature and Wind Speed -I use the average daily temperature ( F) and resultant wind speed (tenths of mile/hour) to control for the weather conditions during tournaments. 13 In all reported speci…cations, I use upper and lower temperature quartile dummy variables to indicate temperatures that are "hot (above 80 F) and "very cold"(below 62 F).
Lagged Rainfall -Inches of rain accumulated over the three days before the event also controls for playing conditions. Rain may make the course easier, since moist greens are soft, slow and forgiving. 12 Since golfers'performances may be correlated within a tournament, I also consider clustering by event.
The results are qualitatively similar to those presented in the tables and are not reported separately. 13 Resultant wind speed re ‡ects the net speed of movement by the wind over a de…ned period of time.
Golf Course Dummies -All versions of equation (3) include individual golf course dummies to capture unobserved course heterogeneities.
14 Total Purse -Purse variables re ‡ect tournaments'monetary incentives. In all reported speci…cations, I use the total purse in thousands of dollar, de ‡ated by a monthly Consumer Price Index. 15 Field Quality -The competitiveness of the …eld of players is proxied by the average OWGR rank points of the participants (excluding Woods). Section 3 provides OWGR details.
The matrix of player attributes, Y i , may include the following variables:
Golfer Dummies -All versions of the equation (3) include dummy variables for individual golfers to capture unobserved heterogeneity in skill level.
World Golf Ranking Points -While player dummies capture much of the golfer-level variation, players'skills may develop or degenerate over time. Changes in a player's skill is proxied by his monthly OWGR points average.
Observations from alternate (e.g., Air Canada Championship, Reno-Tahoe and B.C. Opens) and small-…eld tournaments (e.g., Mercedes and Tour Championships) are omitted. Alternate and small-…eld events select only lower or higher skills players, respectively, and are not typical tournaments.
First-Round E¤ects
Since players make critical e¤ort-related decisions prior to the start of events, any e¤ect of a superstar in the tournament …eld should be apparent in the …rst round. Table 4 reports results using players' …rst-round scores in regular and major PGA tournaments-between 140 and 170 golfers in each events. Approximately half of any tournament …eld fails to the make the cut. Full-tournament analysis is described in sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 below. Regression 4.1 includes both major and regular tournaments, while regression 4.2 excludes major and WGC events. In both cases, the superstar e¤ect for exempt players is positive and large. For major and regular events, exempt players'…rst-round scores are 0.16 strokes higher when Woods is in the …eld, relative to when he is not. Examining only regular events, the superstar e¤ect is 0.18 strokes. I reject the hypothesis that 1 + 3 = 0 at p-values 14 "Slope" is another measure of course di¢ culty, assigned by the USGA and bounded between 55 and 155. The slope ratings of many Tour courses are censored at the maximum. For example, several US Open courses have slopes of 155, but are widely considered to be more di¢ cult than the rating suggests. While the USGA slope rating may represent course quality during non-professional play, the rating is not indicative of Tour event di¢ culty and is omitted from the reported regressions. When included, the coe¢ cients on the slope variable are not statistical signi…cant. 15 Although not reported, I also estimated equation (3) using upper and lower total purse quartile dummy variables for a given year. Results were qualitatively similar.
< 0:05 and 0:01 in each regression, respectively. The magnitude of the e¤ect is substantial, particularly when one considers that an average of 2 (and as many as 8) players share …rst place after the …rst round of tournament play. Moreover, accounting for ties, the top two …rst-round scores in a tournament di¤er by an average of only 0.8 strokes. Positions at the end of each round matter to golfers-ranks determine the following day's pairings, tee-times and media coverage.
The superstar e¤ect for non-exempt players is positive and statistically signi…cant for regular events-in regression 4.2, non-exempt players appear to play approximately 0.2 strokes worse when Woods participates, relative to when he does not. However, the superstar coef…cient for non-exempt players is not statistically di¤erent from zero when major and regular events are considered. Relative to exempt players, for whom a signi…cant superstar e¤ect estimate is persistent across speci…cations, non-exempt golfers may be less a¤ected by the presence of a superstar. Lower-skilled players are likely not in "real" competition with top golfers, and the marginal value of improved play is small for players lower in the prize distribution.
The superstar e¤ect is not sensitive to the speci…cation of particular control variables. Although not reported, the estimates are robust across alternative speci…cations of the purse and temperature measures, including linear and quadratic terms, and multiple dummy variables.
Other coe¢ cients in Table 4 are also reasonable and relatively stable across regressions. Scores in the …rst rounds of the majors tend to be signi…cantly higher than regular eventscourses played in the majors are more di¢ cult than courses used for regular tournaments. Longer courses result in slightly higher scores. Weather also has the expected e¤ects: cold temperatures and increased wind lead to higher scores.
Interestingly, higher purses actually appear to induce slightly higher scores-raising the purse by $100,000 is associated with 0.04 increase in …rst-round score. While this result is counter to the …ndings in Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a,b), Orszag (1994) concludes that changes in tournament prize money did not signi…cantly a¤ect golfers'scores. One plausible explanation for the current result is that the purse variable is capturing unmeasured changes in course di¢ culty. 16 The controls for the quality of the …eld are negative in regressions 4.1 and 4.2, suggesting that stronger …elds may lead to lower scores. Individual quality coe¢ cient estimates indicate that players post lower scores as their historical ranking improves.
All Regular and Major Tournaments
Does the superstar e¤ect that I identify in the …rst round persist and lead to worse overall tournament performance? Table 5 reports results using from players who made the cut in PGA Tour events. Golfers who make the cut play all four (or …ve) tournament rounds and are guaranteed a cash prize. Regression 5.1 includes both major and regular tournaments, while regression 5.2 includes only regular events. In both cases, the superstar e¤ect for exempt players is positive and large. Examining major and regular events, the tournament scores of exempt players are 0.9 strokes higher when Woods is present. Using only regular events, the superstar e¤ect for exempt players is 0.6 strokes. I reject the hypothesis that 1 + 3 = 0 at p-values < 0:01 in both regressions. The size of the e¤ect is substantial-on average, less than two strokes separate 1 st and 2 nd place in PGA tournaments.
The superstar e¤ect for non-exempt players is positive and statistically signi…cant for majors and regular tournaments-in regression 5.1, non-exempt players appear to play 0.6 strokes per tournament worse in events with the superstar (p-value < 0:01). When only regular events are examined in regression 5.2, however, the e¤ect for non-exempt players is 0.5 strokes per tournament (p-value< 0:05). In both regressions, the magnitude of the superstar e¤ect for non-exempt players is smaller than the estimates for exempt players. This results is not surprising given that, on average, lower skilled players are less likely to be competing with the superstar for the top prize money. Between 1999 and 2006, a non-exempt player won fewer than 5% of the regular tour events.
Other coe¢ cients in Table 5 are also relatively stable across the regressions. As in Table  4 , scores in major and international events tend to be signi…cantly higher than regular events. Longer courses result in higher scores, although the e¤ect is small. Weather also has the expected e¤ects: cold temperatures and increased wind leads to higher scores, while recent precipitation leads to lower scores. Purse-related coe¢ cients are positive, small and statistically signi…cant. Improved quality of the individual player and the …eld result in lower tournament scores.
"Tiger-Played" Courses
Results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest an adverse superstar e¤ect, but one might ask: Is this e¤ect simply capturing unobserved heterogeneity in the tournaments that Woods enters and those that he avoids? Woods typically plays less than 20 of the 45 PGA events year and notoriously selects challenging courses. In theory, if other players were responding di¤erently to purse, course, and weather conditions on those "Tiger-played" courses, relative to their behavior on other courses, then the observed superstar e¤ect could be driven by Woods's course preferences. In practice, however, my results suggest that the superstar e¤ect remains strong, even after accounting for Woods's course selection.
I narrow the sample to golf courses on which Woods has sometimes competed. 17 Because this smaller dataset is robust to potential bias caused by Woods's selection criteria, I often use this subsample in the remainder of my analysis. Table 6 presents results from replicating regressions 6.1 and 6.2 using the subsample of tournaments. 18 As above, the results in Table 6 suggest that Woods's presence a¤ects di¤erently the performance of exempt and non-exempt players. The performance of higherskilled competitors is adversely a¤ected by the presence of the superstar-exempt players' tournament scores are approximately 0.85 strokes higher when Woods competes (I reject
The superstar e¤ect can also be estimated by individual player. Figure 2 presents a histogram of the statistically signi…cant superstar e¤ects for all exempt players in regular events on "Tiger-Played" courses. The shape of the distribution suggests that the results in Tables 4, 5 and 6 are capturing a mean e¤ect-that is, the superstar e¤ect is not being driven by a small number of particularly susceptible players.
In regressions 6.1 and 6.2, the superstar e¤ect for non-exempt players is not statistically di¤erent from zero at conventional levels. Unlike their more experienced or skilled tour counterparts, the average non-exempt player appears una¤ected by the presence of the superstar-perhaps because non-exempt players are less frequently in contention.
Coe¢ cient estimates for the control variables in Table 6 imply the expected relationships. On average, scores from major tournaments are approximately 6 strokes higher than those from regular events. Wind and cold temperatures result in worse play, while rain and hot conditions improve scores. Purse-related e¤ects are very small and statistically signi…cant in major tournaments, and not statistically signi…cant in regular events alone.
"Hot" and "Cool"
Although his career has been extraordinary, Tiger Woods has not always been perceived as unbeatable. In 2003 and 2004, Woods failed to win a major event, and the media reported that "Tiger slump gives rivals hope"and "Woods'year a major disappointment." 19 Results
in Tables 4, 5 and 6 included a single indicator for the presence of the superstar, the empirical analogy of …xing relative skill, ; in Section 2. If, instead, I allowed to take on high and low values, then I would expect players'e¤ort to respond accordingly. When the superstar was relative "hot"(large ) ; e¤ort would be low and the superstar e¤ect should be large. When the superstar was relatively "cool" (small ) ; e¤ort would be high and the superstar e¤ect should be small. To operationalize these predictions, I estimate equation (3) with "hot"and "cool" indicators for Woods's more and less successful periods, respectively. Estimates of the variables of interest are reported in Table 7 . I identify hot and cool periods by calculating the di¤erence between Woods's average score and other exempt players'average score in the previous month. When Woods's performance is not remarkably better than other golfers-score di¤erences in the bottom quintile-he is in a cool period. When Woods's scores are remarkably lower than his competitors-score di¤erences in the top quintile-he is in a hot period. Score di¤erences in the second to fourth quintiles represent Woods's typical performance. 20 To conserve space, I do not report the full results since they are similar to those in Table 5 . Regression 7.1 and 7.2 examine overall tournament scores, while regressions 7.3 and 7.4 use …rst-round data. Similar to the results holding "superstardom" …xed, the superstar effect during Woods's typical play (i.e. neither hot nor cool periods) is approximately 0.8 strokes per tournament for exempt players (p-values < 0:01). During Woods's hot periods, the superstar e¤ect for exempt players more than doubles to between 1.5 and 1.8 strokes per tournament (p-values < 0:01): Cool periods have the opposite e¤ect on the superstar coef…cients: golfers may actually play better when Woods is perceived to be weaker (and beatable). The adverse superstar e¤ect disappears for exempt players-coe¢ cients are negative and statistically signi…cant (p-values < 0:05): Similarly, the superstar e¤ect for non-exempt players is signi…cantly larger when Woods is hot, relative to when he is a "typical superstar," and negative when Woods is cool.
A similar pattern emerges from …rst round scores. The superstar e¤ect during Woods's typical periods is small and not statistically di¤erent from zero for both exempt and nonexempt players. However, when Woods is playing particularly well, the superstar e¤ect is between 0.58 and 0.71 strokes per round for exempt players and between 0.48 and 0.64 strokes per round for non-exempt players (p-values < 0:01). In contrast, when the superstar is weak, the e¤ects are negative and, in most cases, statistically signi…cant.
The tournament and …rst-round hot and cool e¤ects are consistent with predictions from simple theory model in section 2: The superstar e¤ect is large when the Woods is particularly "super"and the e¤ect is small when Woods is struggling.
Tiger "In the Hunt"
A similar hot and cool pattern is evident within tournaments. From 1999 to 2006, Woods won every tournament in which he held the lead going into the …nal round. Woods's limitation are sometimes evident, however-he has never overcome more than a …ve-stroke de…cit after Saturday to win a PGA event. I assert that Woods is "in the hunt" when he is within …ve strokes of the lead after Saturday, and present regression results in Table 8 .
Regression 8.1 reports a statistically signi…cant di¤erence in the superstar e¤ect when Woods is in and out of contention-the in and out of the hunt superstar coe¢ cients for exempt players are statistically di¤erent from each other at p-value of 0:02: When Woods is in the hunt in the …nal round, exempt players'Sunday scores are 0.19 strokes higher than when Woods is not in the …eld (p-value < 0:01). When Woods falls behind, the superstar e¤ect for exempt players is negative and not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels. The superstar e¤ect for non-exempt players is 0.02 strokes when Woods has a strong position in the …eld and negative when he is lagging. However, these values are not statistically di¤erent from zero or each other.
"Toughening Up" the Course
While the basic geography of a course is …xed, tournament organizers can vary the challenges faced by golfers over years and within tournaments. For example, over time, courses can add bunkers or move tee boxes. Within tournaments, organizers can select pin placements to adjust hole di¢ culty. 21 It is possible that organizers set tough pin placements when Woods
participates; yet, this alone does not rationalize the pattern of results. Since pins are set for the round, exempt and non-exempt competitors face the same terrain. If physical course changes were driving the superstar e¤ect, then we would expect the performance of both types of players to su¤er. Indeed, we might even expect the lowerskilled golfers to be more a¤ected. The results in Tables 4 to 8 suggest the opposite-except for the estimate in regression 4.2, the adverse superstar e¤ect for non-exempt player is smaller than the e¤ect for exempt players. While tournament directors may adjust course di¢ culty for …elds of players, the observed adverse superstar e¤ect cannot be explained by pin placement alone. Table 4 presents an analysis of the performance of golfers who entered tournaments. Tables  5 and 6 re…ne that further to examine only players who made the cut in those events. That is, I have studied only a certain type and quality of player. Anecdotal evidence suggests that golfers may amend their playing commitments to accommodate Woods's schedulewhen Woods withdrew only a week before the 2007 Nissan Open, Phil Mickelson announced his participation. 22 Could it be that better players avoid tournaments with Woods? And, in turn, that the di¤erences in the composition of the …eld in these events is driving the superstar e¤ect? The answer is no. On average, 60% of the …eld in regular and major tournaments with the superstar is exempt, while only 53% of the …eld is exempt in tournaments where Woods does not participate. Approximately 70% of the …eld after the cut is exempt when the superstar is present, compared to 63% of the …eld without Woods. These …eld composition measures are statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from each other at p-values < 0:01: On "Tiger-played"courses, there are slightly more exempt players in the …eld with Woods, relative to when Woods is not in attendance. However, these di¤erences are not statistically signi…cant from each other at conventional levels.
Composition of the Field
If anything, the direction of the di¤erences suggest that tournaments with Woods have more competitive …elds of closely-matched participants (except the superstar) that could lead to better play. 23 Indeed, this …eld e¤ect could o¤set, at least in part, the adverse e¤ects of the superstar. Note the I include an index of the quality of the …eld, the average OWGR points of the participants, in all reported speci…cations.
The "Distraction Factor"
Fan and media attention may be distracting for professional golfers-John Daly withdrew from the 2007 Honda Classic after being distracted by a photographer and Tiger Woods complained when fans broke his concentration at the 2006 British Open. In 1996, PGA tournaments attracted an average of 107,000 spectators; by 1999, average attendance was 148,800. Attendance …gures have continued to grow-the 2006 FBR Open attracted nearly 540,000 fans. Of all players on the Tour, Woods attracts the largest following. Thus, one might ask: Can the superstar e¤ect be attributed to increased media distraction when Woods participates in an event?
While the results in Table 7 suggest a diminished (or positive) superstar e¤ect during his "cooler" periods, Woods remained a fan and media favorite. If competitors' higher scores were due to distractions, then reduced performance should have been evident across all typical, hot and cool periods.
Scaring the Competition
With an impressive collection of titles, Woods is a formidable opponent on the golf course.
Is it possible that he is so intimidating that he scares his competition? Could the superstar e¤ect be a result of intimidation and not reduced e¤ort? If intimidation is leading to higher scores, then golfers playing near the superstar should be particularly a¤ected-golfers teeingo¤ with Woods should be more "scared"than those who teed-o¤ hours before. Yet, this does not appear to be the case. Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2007) With data from 1999 to 2006, I address this issue using data from the …nal round. Tournaments pairings are determined by players'performance on the previous day; players with high scores start early, while leaders take the …nal spots. From Thursday, Friday and Saturday scores, I can determine Sunday's couples. 24 To examine on-course intimidation, I estimate equation (3) for Sunday and include additional indicators for being paired ahead, behind or with Woods. Since Woods's position in the …eld may also matter-results discussed in section 4.1.4 suggest that a lagging superstar may not a¤ect his competitors' play-I interact the pair indicators with whether Woods is "in the hunt"or not. Table 9 reports the total e¤ect for exempt and non-exempt players and additional e¤ects for players grouped near Woods on the course. Regressions 9.1 examines all major and regular events, while regression 9.2 restricts the analysis to only "Tiger-Played"tournaments. The estimated superstar e¤ects for exempt and non-exempt are similar to those reported in Table 8 -exempt players su¤er a large and statistically signi…cant superstar e¤ect when Woods is in contention (p-values < 0:05), while the e¤ect for non-exempt players is smaller and not statistically di¤erent from zero.
If intimidation were driving the superstar e¤ect, I would expect golfers playing closer to Woods to be more adversely a¤ected by his presence. Results are mixed: Examining all major and regular events, the scores of exempt players are higher when they are grouped with Woods, regardless of whether he is in contention or not. Yet, when I restrict the sample to "Tiger-Played" courses, these di¤erential impacts are much smaller and are not statistically signi…cant. Playing ahead of or behind Woods's group appears to have no additional statistical impact on players'performance.
Risky Strategies (i.e. Going for the Green)
Do golfers employ riskier strategies when they face the superstar relative to their play in more "winnable"tournaments? For example, does a golfer shoot over a corner of trees when competing against the superstar, but select a more conservative approach against a nonsuperstar rival? I use hole-by-hole data to try to identify di¤erences in players'strategies in the presence or absence of the superstar. 25 Risky shots sometimes succeed and, other times, fail-uncertainty widens the distribution of scores relative to more conservative play. I calculate the variance of individual's hole-byhole scores within each round of a tournament and use this measure of "riskiness"to identify di¤erences in the distribution of scores in tournaments with and without Woods. Using within-round variance as the dependent variable, I estimate equation (3) for all major and regular tournaments and Tiger-played courses. The speci…cation includes the controls used in Tables 4, 5 and 6, in addition to round-level …xed e¤ects.
Results in Table 10 suggest that the presence of the superstar does not lead to increased variance in players'scores. In regression 10.1, both superstar related coe¢ cients are negative and statistically signi…cant (p-values < 0:01 and < 0:05 for exempt and non-exempt players, respectively). Examining only "Tiger-Played" courses, the superstar appears to have little impact on score variance for both exempt and non-exempt players; the superstar-related coe¢ cients are not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at conventional levels.
In both regressions, the variance of scores in rounds 3 and 4 tends to be higher than variance in the …rst two rounds of play. This …nding is not surprising given that golfers may play relatively cautiously before the cut, then adopt riskier strategies once they are guaranteed a cash prize-Saturday, when players often jockey for position, is sometimes called "moving day"on the tour. Overall, this hole-level analysis provides little evidence that Woods's presence induces players riskier strategies that result in higher scores and the observed superstar e¤ect.
To summarize:
1. A superstar leads to reduced performance from other competitors in a tournament:
Players'…rst round scores are nearly 0.2 strokes higher when Woods participates, relative to when Woods is not in the …eld. Across all rounds of a tournament, the adverse superstar e¤ect for exempt PGA golfers'scores is, on average, almost one stroke.
2. Higher scores are not due to the adoption of "riskier"strategies by competitors: Golfers' within-round score variance is not statistically signi…cantly higher when Woods is in the …eld, relative to when he does not participate.
3. Superstars must be "super" to create adverse e¤ects: The adverse superstar e¤ect is large during Woods's "hot"periods and disappears during his "cool"periods. Within a tournament, the adverse e¤ect is large when the superstar is "in the hunt" and not statistically signi…cant when he lags in the …nal round.
Conclusion
While there are many situations in which tournament-style internal competition improves worker performance, tournament and contest theory suggests that large inherent skill di¤er-ences between competitors can have the perverse e¤ect of reducing e¤ort incentives under competition. The main contribution of this paper is to investigate whether this theoretical possibility matters in practice. Using a rich panel dataset of the performance of PGA Tour golfers, I present evidence that a "superstar e¤ect" is in fact present in professional golf tournaments.
It is useful to know not only that incentives are adversely a¤ected by the presence of a superstar, but also the economic magnitude of the e¤ect. Consider the following counterfactual: How much would Tiger Woods's earnings have been reduced if his competitors played as well as they did when he was not in the …eld? In my main results, I identify a superstar e¤ect of nearly one stroke for exempt players. To answer this question, I simulate the distribution of prizes if all exempt players'scores had been one stroke lower when they competed against Woods-that is, I removed the estimated superstar e¤ect from exempt players'scores. My calculations suggest that Woods's PGA Tour earnings would have fallen from $48.1 million to $43.2 million between 1999 and 2006 had his competitors'performance not su¤ered the superstar e¤ect. Woods has pocketed an estimated $4.9 million in additional earnings because of the reduced e¤ort of other golfers-prize money that would otherwise have been distributed to other players in the …eld. Viewed in this light, the superstar e¤ect is economically substantial.
The implications of the superstar e¤ect extend beyond the PGA Tour and, in principle, require …rms to be cautious in using "best athlete" hiring policies in organizations where internal competition is a key driver of incentives. For example, sale managers should be aware of the consequences of introducing a superstar team member, and law …rms should consider the impact of a superstar associate on the cohort's overall performance. Understanding the superstar e¤ect is a …rst step towards learning how to best structure situations where competition exists between players of heterogeneous abilities.
Outside of the …rm context, the superstar e¤ect identi…ed in this paper is an example of how peer e¤ects interact with individual incentives to a¤ect decision-making. A key …nding of peer e¤ect research, particularly in the school-performance literature, is that individuals are in ‡uenced by the abilities and behaviors of other members of their cohort (cf. Zimmerman, 2003) . Classrooms are increasingly competitive environments in which students' abilities are judged against the performance of their peers. While there are substantial gaps in translating professional golfers'tournament performances to children's school behavior, my results suggest that there is a potential downside to introducing tournament-style incentives into a classroom setting with a "superstar" pupil. Indeed, my research suggests that one possible outcome of such an introduction is a reduction in the e¤ort of other students who are unlikely to win the status or rewards associated with being a top class performer. World Ranking Points 
